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Introduction
In many countries, unemployment bene…ts are organized as a two-tier scheme. If a worker is dismissed, he has access to unemployment insurance bene…ts for an eligibility period which may depend on individual characteristics. When the time limit is reached, the unemployed is moved to another program, such as unemployment assistance or social assistance, and bene…ts are reduced. A similar structure can sometimes be found in pure welfare schemes. The most prominent example is the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in the United States. It states that, starting from 1996, nobody is eligible for receiving welfare payments based on the federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program for more than …ve years in lifetime and two years per spell. Should time run out, there is no further access to federal cash bene…ts, but only to some state-…nanced food stamp program in order to guarantee physical subsistence. This paper focuses on the impact of introducing time limits on unemployment bene-…ts on employment, wages, pro…ts, and utility levels of both employed and unemployed workers. In contrast to the bulk of the empirical literature, which mainly addresses incentives for labor supply (see Blank, 2002 , Lalive et al., 2004 , a framework with involuntary unemployment is chosen. The contribution can be seen as complementing earlier analyses in which the success of welfare reform depends on changes of the behavior of recipients.
If jobs are easily available, the reason for potential increases in employment is straightforward. Recipients of unemployment bene…ts will reduce their reservation wages when faced with a drop in their income. Under involuntary unemployment, labor demand will respond to changes in the incentive structure of the employed who see unemployment as a more severe threat now. New job opportunities are created a¤ecting the well-being of forward-looking welfare recipients. These general equibrium e¤ects may compensate them for the time limits imposed. Some evidence that the decline in welfare caseloads is actually driven by labor demand can be found in the empirical literature. For example, Ziliak et al. (2000) estimate that 1 about two thirds of the caseload decline in the Aid for Families With Dependent Children program observed between 1993 and 1996 is explained by macroeconomic factors represented, e.g., by lower unemployment rates. Only one third can be attributed to several regional welfare reforms adopted in various states. Similarly, Arulampalam and Stewart (1995) …nd for the UK that the e¤ect of unemployment income on the individual hazard rate to exit from unemployment is substantially lower in periods of high unemployment, while demand-side factors captured by the local unemployment rate have a strong negative e¤ect on the exit probability. Hence, an analysis of the e¤ects of a time-limits reform is needed for a framework in which labor demand plays a decisive role while search e¤ort is of secondary importance. In the light of our approach, the fall in unemployment in the U.S. should not be viewed as indicating some exogenous business cycle phenomenon. It may at least partially be traced back to stricter welfare eligibility rules that enable …rms to cut wages.
We analyze an e¢ciency wage model where workers may shirk. The two levels of bene…ts for the unemployed are called unemployment bene…ts and social assistance. As we are mainly interested in studying the e¤ects of changing time limits, we take the relevant bene…t levels as given. Both types of bene…ts are …nanced by a proportional income tax. In the basic model, all individuals are identical with respect to ability and preferences.
It is shown that imposing a stricter time limit on receiving unemployment bene…ts increases employment. Since unemployment is made less comfortable, employers can cut gross wages and raise employment without having to fear that workers lose their incentive to exert e¤ort. With a smaller number of unemployed, the tax burden tends to fall. However, since the average duration of unemployment falls with an increasing employment level, the share of short-term unemployed receiving full bene…ts may go in either direction. In some special cases the increase in short-term unemployment might be more costly than the decrease in long-term unemployment and hence lead to an increase in overall bene…t payments. Apart from this special case, the tax rate is generally expected to fall if the time limit is shortened. This enables …rms to lower gross wages even further and to hire even more workers. Imposing a stricter time limit will generally raise net pro…ts due to falling gross wages and a lower tax rate. The impact on net wages is ambiguous. Expected lifetime utility levels of employed workers and unemployment bene…t recipients will move in the same direction as net wages. The utility di¤erential between the two groups remains constant because it is determined by the structure of incentives for employed workers. Recipients of unemployment bene…ts are compensated for the risk of losing parts of the welfare bene…t by improved job opportunities. Those who would be on social assistance anyway may gain in utility even if the net wage declines because their prospects of getting a job are improved. The result indicates that imposing stricter time limits can even lead to a Pareto improvement.
Extending the analysis to a richer skill structure of the workforce, skilled workers will earn a higher wage and face a lower unemployment rate. We consider a benchmark scenario in which the two types of workers are perfect substitutes. Although skilled workers subsidize bene…ts for unskilled workers, the impact on welfare of the two groups is almost symmetric, and con…rms the results from the basic model. The utility di¤erential between skilled and unskilled workers of a given employment status moves in the same direction as the net wage of unskilled workers.
Finally, we analyze a variation in which shirkers who are dismissed do not have access to unemployment bene…ts. As a stricter time limit implies a higher probability for nonshirkers to lose the high-level unemployment bene…ts and drop down to the lower bene…t level of social assistance, the value of not shirking in the workplace is reduced. Thus, tightening the time limit makes shirking more and not less attractive, which tends to require a higher wage associated with lower employment. At the same time, the smaller bene…t per unemployed allows a cut in the tax rate which tends to lower the gross wage 3 and to increase employment. The overall employment e¤ect is ambiguous. It turns out that the change in employment is decisive for the impact on utility levels of employed workers and social assistance recipients. Compared to these two groups, the relative utility position of short-term unemployed de…nitely deteriorates.
Our contribution is to some extent related to the theory of optimum unemployment insurance. A basic proposition of this literature states that payments should stay constant over time if the unemployed cannot in ‡uence their chances of gaining a job. In contrast, if the re-employment opportunities are determined by unobservable search e¤orts, expected utility of the bene…ciaries is maximized by a declining bene…t schedule that converges to zero (Shavell and Weiss, 1979) . Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) argue that welfare can be further increased in such a moral hazard scenario if the personal wage tax increases with the duration of unemployment. However, Cahuc and Lehmann (2000) show that declining unemployment bene…ts may even lead to a higher unemployment rate, since insiders will drive up their wage demands when expecting a shorter period of unemployment upon losing their job. Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) demonstrate within an equilibrium search model that the optimum time limit for receiving the higher bene…t in a two tier unemployment insurance system is always positive and …nite. The optimum time limit exceeds zero because the search e¤ort of those receiving the smaller bene…t increases in the duration of the full bene…t. Hassler and Rodriguez Mora (2002) argue that unemployment bene…ts should even increase over time if the insurer cannot observe consumption and savings. Individuals then prefer to …nance short spells of unemployment by precautionary savings. Williamson (1996, 2002) add job-retention e¤orts of employed workers as a second source of moral hazard. They derive non-monotonic optimum bene…t schedules and stress that the optimum scheme depends on the worker's employment history.
Rather than deriving an optimum bene…t schedule, we take as …xed the bene…t levels in a system with at most two tiers, focusing on the distributional and welfare consequences of varying a stochastic time limit. This approach is justi…ed in our analysis of a shirking model based on the result that, even with highly risk averse agents, the optimum scheme may simply consist of a minimum level of bene…ts, say zero, from the very beginning (Fath and Fuest, 2005) . Nevertheless, it is interesting to look at the distributional consequences of a labor market reform that changes only the time limit that is relevant for a substantial reduction in bene…t entitlements.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is introduced in Section 2. Section 3 analyzes problems of existence and stability of equilibria. Comparative static results are derived in section 4. Section 5 introduces heterogeneity in productivity across agents into our basic framework, and section 6 deals with a structure where shirkers who are dismissed are not entitled to receive unemployment bene…ts.
Section 7 concludes, discusses the …ndings and indicates directions for future research.
The basic model
The model is based on Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) . We consider N identical workers whose preferences are described by the utility function U(!; e) = ! ¡ e, where ! denotes the monetary compensation and e is the e¤ort exerted at the workplace. With probability b per unit of time, an employment relationship breaks down for exogenous reasons. Workers are in…nitely lived and maximize W = E R 1 0 U (!(s); e(s)) exp(¡rs)ds; where s denotes time, r > 0 is the discount rate, and E represents the expectations operator. Employed workers can either shirk (e = 0) or choose the required e¤ort (e = 1). Workers who are shirking are detected with probability q per unit of time. Detected shirkers are …red immediately. All individuals are identical with respect to ability and preferences. We ignore all issues arising from savings and means tests to qualify for a welfare program.
The unemployed …rst receive an unemployment bene…t w until the time limit is exhausted. The others get w, henceforth called social assistance, where w > w¸0: In many existing two-tier schemes of unemployment compensation, the upper tier is represented by unemployment insurance bene…ts, while the lower tier is often some welfare program.
Reinterpreted for an American-style welfare system, the higher bene…t is meant to provide some minimum level of income above the physical subsistence level, while the lower bene…t may represent a food-stamp program. Initially, both shirkers and non-shirkers have access to high unemployment bene…ts. In the basic model we ignore the fact that in many unemployment compensation schemes access to high bene…ts is denied in some cases of behavioral misconduct, a point stressed by Atkinson (1995) . The bene…ts are …nanced by a proportional tax on wages and pro…ts, the tax rate being t.
Let V ¾ " ,V ½ " , and V u denote expected lifetime utility of employed shirkers, employed non-shirkers, and unemployed individuals receiving the full amount of unemployment bene…ts, respectively. The asset equations for shirkers and non-shirkers are given by
and
with w denoting the gross wage.
These asset equations have the structure that the return in a given period is equal to the ‡ow bene…ts plus the expected change of the value of the asset. An employed worker
the no-shirking condition. If workers were risk averse, a lower wage as the one given in
(3) would be su¢cient to induce e¤ort. Such a modi…cation would, however, not lead to substantially di¤erent results.
Firms are operating under decreasing returns. Output of the representative …rm is given by Q = F (L) where L denotes e¤ective labor, i.e. the number of employed workers who are not shirking. The production function satis…es F 0 (L) > 0; F 00 (L) < 0 and F 0 (N) > e. The last assumption implies that full employment would be e¢cient.
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An unemployed worker receiving bene…t w will get a job with probability a per unit of time. Rather than introducing a …xed time limit, the loss of the full bene…t is modeled in a stochastic fashion. In a given period, access to regular bene…ts is lost with probability h.
The hazard rate h corresponds to an expected time limit and is seen as a policy variable.
If h = 0, there is no time limit imposed on unemployment bene…ts. The asset equation of an unemployed worker receiving regular bene…ts is
where V " = max fV ¾ " ; V ½ " g ; and V z denotes expected lifetime utility of a social assistance recipient. We ignore the possibilities that …rms are reluctant to hire long-term unemployed or previously detected shirkers. Therefore, the job acquisition rate is independent of the unemployment status. The asset equation of a welfare recipient reads
If not shirking is optimal, (2), (4), and (5) can be solved. Combining (4) and (5) yields
and subtracting (4) from (2) leads to
Solving the last two equations for the lifetime utility di¤erentials, it turns out that
This implies
Inserting (10) into the no-shirking condition yields
Inducing workers not to shirk requires a higher wage w if either type of bene…ts, w or w, rises, the rate of exogenous splits b increases, the probability of …nding a new job a goes up, the tax rate t increases, the rate of time preference r rises, or the quality of monitoring e¤ort, measured by q, falls. Equations (8) and (13) imply that employed workers will enjoy a higher expected remaining lifetime utility than those being unemployed at any given point in time. Thus, unemployment is involuntary. Compared to those receiving full bene…ts w, employed workers earn the information rent e q . The rent arises due to the fact that the monitoring technology is imperfect, that is, q is …nite.
In equilibrium, the number of entries into unemployment must be equal to the number of exits,
Similarly, the number of entries into social assistance has to be equal to the number of exits,
While U individuals receive unemployment bene…ts, N ¡ L ¡ U individuals participate in the welfare program. Last, the number of entrants into unemployment bene…ts is equal to the number of leavers, bL = (a + h)U:
As a = b L N ¡ L , substituting for a from (14) into (13) leads to
8 Unemployment bene…ts are …nanced through a proportional income tax t on pro…ts and labour income. The tax base is, therefore, equal to total output F (L), implying that the government budget equation reads
If workers do not shirk, the representative …rm will set its labor input to the point where the marginal product of labor is equal to the gross wage, that is, where w = F 0 (L).
Utilizing this relationship and building on (14) and (16),
All relevant decisions are taken simultaneously. The government always adjusts the income tax rate instantaneously so as to balance its budget. Firms generally take as given both the wage and the tax rate and choose employment in order to maximize their pro…ts.
They are willing to accept underbidding by unemployed workers as long as net wages are higher than necessary to satisfy the no-shirking constraint. Conversely, should the net wage be too low to prevent workers from shirking, …rms will increase the gross wage.
Taking as given wages, policy variables and the unemployment rate, employed workers choose whether or not to shirk.
Equilibria and stability
An equilibrium is described by a level of employment that satis…es both the no-shirking condition (17), now with equality, and the feasibility condition (19). The right-hand side of the no-shirking condition (17) is equal to
It increases in L and tends to in…nity if L ! N. Note that the right-hand side of the feasibility condition (19) will be equal to F 0 (N) > 0 if L = N. Moreover, provided that (19) shows that an equilibrium has to satisfy
where f 1 = f 2 = 0: The dynamic evolution of the two key variables is given by
The …rst di¤erential equation expresses that wages will be cut if the no-shirking constraint is not binding, while there is a wage increase when the no-shirking condition is not satis…ed. The second equation of motion implies that employment will be reduced if the gross wage exceeds the marginal product of labor, and vice versa. For a locally stable equilibrium, it is necessary that the determinant of the Jacobian of the system of di¤erential equations is non-negative at the equilibrium, and that its trace is non-positive.
These conditions translate into @f 2 @L ¡ @f 1 @L > 0 and © 0
The former condition requires that the NSC curve cuts the G curve from below.
In Figure 1 , the equilibrium at the employment level L 1 is a saddle point, and therefore unstable. If a point on the G curve between L 1 and L 2 is realized, the …rm is willing to accept underbidding by unemployed workers. As a consequence, employment will increase and the gross wage rate will fall. Underbidding will no longer be accepted at L 2 since the no-shirking condition would then be violated. The equilibrium at L 2 is always a locally stable focus if the G curve is downward sloping at this point. It is still a locally stable focus with an upward sloping G curve if the condition on the trace is met.
Changing the bene…t loss rate
Proposition 1 summarizes the e¤ects of an increasing risk of losing the full unemployment bene…t and having to rely on social assistance.
Proposition 1 Employment L increases and the gross wage w decreases with a higher bene…t loss rate (that is, a tighter time limit) h. The lifetime utility di¤erential between employed workers and short-term unemployed, V " ¡ V u , remains constant. The lifetime utility di¤erential between unemployment bene…t recipients and social assistance recipients, V u ¡ V z , shrinks. Lifetime utility levels of employed workers and short-term unemployed move in the same direction as the net wage.
Proof. See Appendix A. ¤
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The comparative statics can be interpreted as follows. A higher bene…t loss rate is equivalent to a stricter time limit of receiving unemployment bene…ts. As a consequence, the threat of unemployment becomes more severe. The minimum wage needed to induce e¤ort at the workplace decreases, which corresponds to a downward shift of the NSC curve. Due to a higher share of food stamp recipients at a given level of unemployment, the tax burden decreases. The feasibility curve G shifts upwards for any positive unemployment level. Any given gross wage now corresponds to a higher net wage. The tax reduction thus represents a second channel allowing to cut gross wages and increase employment.
The unemployed are a¤ected by the loss in expected bene…ts. At the same time, their job opportunities are becoming better. Moreover, their net wage changes once they reenter employment. For employed workers, the threat of becoming unemployed is more serious now due to a stricter time limit for receiving the full bene…t. At the same time, the increasing opportunities of regaining employment work in the opposite direction. In any case, employed workers are also confronted with a variation in their net wage. The lifetime utility di¤erential between employed workers and those receiving unemployment bene…ts remains unchanged. This result holds because the no-shirking condition implies that the utility di¤erential is exclusively determined by the level of e¤ort exerted at the workplace and the quality of the detection technology. The net impact on per-period utility for each of these groups is determined by the variation in net wages. By contrast, the impact of the stricter time limit on social assistance recipients is more likely to be positive. As it takes two transitions, into and out of employment, before the time limit can bite, current social assistance recipients are least a¤ected by a tighter time limit. They bene…t from better opportunities to leave unemployment and, as forward-looking agents, also take into account the change in net wages. In terms of absolute utility di¤erentials, their utility position compared to the other two groups of workers improves.
Tedius computations provided in Appendix B show the response of the equilibrium tax rate to a rising bene…t loss rate. The outcome is not obvious because the fall in unemployment will be associated with a smaller share of social assistance recipients among the unemployed. While being quite an implausible scenario, an increase in total unemployment bene…ts via a rising number of recipients of high-level bene…ts cannot be ruled out. It can be demonstrated that the equilibrium tax rate is going to fall if either the discount rate or the bene…t loss rate are su¢ciently small. Therefore, we will ignore the possibility of a perverse tax reaction in the following.
Firms take advantage of the lower gross wage and the lower tax rate. Their net pro…ts must increase according to
The impact on the net wage,
is ambiguous in general and mainly depends on the properties of the production function and the level of unemployment bene…ts. If the marginal product of labor responds to a higher labor input in an unelastic fashion, the tax reduction dominates the reduction in gross wages, implying a rise in net wages. Conversely, if the change in the marginal product of labor is stronger, while unemployment bene…ts are relatively small, the overall e¤ect will go in the opposite direction.
Interestingly, the share of social assistance recipients among the unemployed does not necessarily increase. According to equation (15), the ratio between individuals with regular bene…ts and social assistance recipients is equal to U N ¡ L ¡ U = a h . While a stricter time limit (higher h) directly induces a higher share of welfare recipients, the resulting increase in the employment level is associated with a rising job acquisition rate a. The latter e¤ect reduces the number and the share of those living on social assistance.
Hence, if the increase in employment is so strong that the elasticity´a ;h := h a @a @h exceeds unity, a smaller share of welfare recipients among the unemployed will be the result. This is illustrated by an example presented in Appendix C.
Should net wages fall, it may still be the case that introducing time limits wins a political majority. First, the residual income, which can be interpreted as capital income, increases. Provided that there is a su¢ciently even distribution of wealth, losses in workers' expected utility may be o¤set by gains in capital income. Second, workers may take into account that there is a higher probability to be among the employed under the new framework. A worker taking decisions behind a veil of ignorance -that is, not knowing the realization of his employment status -may therefore opt for the stricter time limit even if this is associated with a utility reduction under all possible employment states.
In fact, the higher total production outweighs the additional e¤ort of the workers. With risk-neutral agents deciding under a veil of ignorance, this property e¤ectively calls for abolishing unemployment bene…ts. At the same time, however, the probability of being faced with the least fortunate state of a social assistance recipient will often increase. If workers are risk averse, it is thus conceivable that a utilitarian government will not simply set the time limit to zero. On the other hand, Fath and Fuest (2005) argue that the impact on the incentives for the employed could be so strong that abolishing all unemployment bene…ts will still be optimal if agents are extremely risk averse.
With the veil of ignorance removed, the outcome can be reversed. A Pareto improvement may even not be achieved by taxing capital on a lump-sum basis and equally redistributing the proceeds among the workers. Note that this type of redistribution would not a¤ect incentives in the model. Yet, as the share of workers enjoying the highest utility level increases, capital owners and both employed and unemployed workers may lose after redistribution has taken place in such a setting.
14 Introducing heterogeneous types of labor represents an extension of the model that is potentially useful to shed more light on the distributional implications of tightening eligibility rules for welfare recipients. In particular, skilled workers will typically subsidize unskilled workers through the unemployment compensation system. Due to the higher productivity of skilled workers, the shirking model implies that their unemployment rate is smaller than the unemployment rate of unskilled workers. Further, at a given proportional tax rate, the higher wage per worker is re ‡ected in higher tax payments. Assume now that …rms use skilled labor S and unskilled labor L as inputs in production. Part of the skilled labor force M as well as the stock of unskilled labor N remain unemployed in order to preserve the incentives to deliver e¤ort at the workplace.
We restrict our attention to a benchmark scenario in which skilled and unskilled labor are perfect substitutes. One unit of skilled labor equals ® > 1 e¢ciency units of unskilled labor. The production function can be written as F (L + ®S) with F 0 > 0 and F 00 < 0.
The gross wage of skilled workers is given by w s = ®w with w denoting the gross wage of unskilled workers. Let eligibility rules for bene…ts, the monitoring technology, and the exogenous separation rate be independent of quali…cation.
Denoting the unemployment rate of skilled workers by µ := M ¡ S M , the no-shirking conditions for unskilled and skilled workers are given by (17) and
respectively. At any given net wage (1¡ t)w, the two inequalities determine the maximum employment that induces workers not to shirk.
The feasibility condition now reads
here U S is the number of skilled social assistance recipients. At given employment levels (S; L), equation (25) determines the gross wage w that satis…es the input rule and the tax rate t that balances the government's budget.
Any equilibrium ((1 ¡ t)w; S; L) is determined by the three equations
with g 1 = g 2 = g 3 = 0.
We restrict our attention to interior solutions where both skilled and unskilled workers will be employed. Then, the two no-shirking conditions (26) and (27) immediately imply that u > µ, that is, the unemployment rate among skilled workers will be smaller than the corresponding rate of unskilled workers. This result is easily understood. The wage di¤erential between skilled and unskilled workers re ‡ects di¤erences in their productivities. Since unemployment bene…ts are independent of quali…cation, a smaller level 16 of equilibrium unemployment is su¢cient to restore work incentives for skilled workers.
With a varying net wage, equations (26) and (27) also imply that changes in group-speci…c unemployment rates will always move in the same direction.
It can easily be checked that all the results stated in Proposition 1 regarding the impact of changes in the bene…t loss rate on employment, wages, utility levels and utility di¤erentials within each skill group can be replicated here. Hence, a higher bene…t loss rate will lead to a reduction in unemployment for each skill group and a fall in gross wages. For each skill group, the lifetime utility di¤erential between employed workers and short-term unemployed remains constant, whereas the utility di¤erential beween the short-term unemployed and the long-term unemployed is shrinking. All utility levels of employed workers and short-term unemployed move in the same direction as the net wage of the unskilled. Proposition 2 summarizes the distributional e¤ects across skill groups of an increasing risk of losing the full unemployment bene…t and having to rely on social assistance.
Proposition 2 With a higher bene…t loss rate (that is, a tighter time limit) h, the lifetime utility di¤erential between skilled employed workers and unskilled employed workers, V S " ¡ V " , moves in the same direction as the net wage of unskilled workers. The same holds for the lifetime utility di¤erential between skilled and unskilled recipients of unemployment bene…ts, V S u ¡ V u . Lifetime utility levels of employed workers and unemployment bene…t recipients move in the same direction as the net wage.
Proof. See Appendix D.
¤ Proposition 2 states that increasing the bene…t loss rate will generally have distributional consequences across skill groups. Both skilled and unskilled workers will bene…t from lower unemployment, and both groups experience a falling gross wage. The reduction of the unemployment rate for the unskilled will typically exceed the one for the skilled workers. On the other hand, the subsidies that skilled workers have to pay to the unskilled via the unemployment compensation scheme will go down.
It turns out that the change in the net wage is crucial for determining the relative winners and losers. If the net wage falls, the utility di¤erential between skilled and unskilled workers in a given employment status is shrinking. Conversely, an increasing net wage is associated with an increasing skill premium in terms of higher lifetime uility.
Restricted bene…t access for shirkers
Let us …nally consider an environment in which shirkers cannot claim high bene…ts. In fact, immediate access to unemployment insurance bene…ts is in many countries denied for workers who quit voluntarily or who are dismissed due to industrial misconduct (Atkinson, 1995) . In this section, taking these rulings as given and enforceable, we modify our model as follows. Dismissed shirkers do not have access to high unemployment bene…ts, but will immediately receive social assistance. By contrast, those who quit their jobs due to exogenous separations still qualify for unemployment bene…ts. The asset equation for shirkers then reads
With this alternative rule, the no-shirking condition changes to
Hence, the minimum net wage necessary to induce e¤ort at the workplace increases with a higher level of the value attached to receiving social assistance and falls with an increasing utility di¤erential between the two states of being unemployed. While the former property is quite intuitive and parallel to the basic model, the latter needs some explanation.
Although hazard rates of exogenous separation are identical for shirkers and non-shirkers, there is a higher probability of being in the state of receiving high bene…ts for non-shirkers after some short (…nite) period of time. Therefore, a higher utility di¤erential between the two states of unemployment discourages shirking.
The other asset equations are not a¤ected by the modi…ed treatment of shirkers, implying that equations (8) and (9) still represent the utility di¤erentials V " ¡ V u and V u ¡ V z . However, as can easily be shown by comparing the asset equations of shirkers and non-shirkers, if the no-shirking condition is satis…ed with equality, the utility di¤erential between employed workers and social assistance recipients is now …xed,
Inserting the solutions of the utility di¤erentials, starting from
the no-shirking condition can be rewritten as
Using the conditions on ‡ow equilibria, this leads to the aggregate no-shirking condition,
At the same time, there is no change of the feasibility equation. Thus the equilibrium vector of ((1 ¡ t)w; L) is determined by the equations (19) and (34).
The results regarding the impact of changes in the bene…t loss rate h on utility levels and di¤erentials are summarized in Proposition 3:
Proposition 3 With a higher bene…t loss rate (that is, a tighter time limit) h, the lifetime utility di¤erential between employed workers and social assistance recipients, V " ¡ V z , remains unchanged. The respective utility levels move in the same direction as employment.
The lifetime utility di¤erential between the two groups of unemployed, V u ¡ V z ; shrinks if @a @h > ¡1, that is, if employment does not decrease too much.
Proof. See Appendix E.
¤
A variation in the bene…t loss rate has no impact on the utility di¤erential between employed workers and social assistance recipients, as this depends only on the e¤ort exerted at the workplace and the shirking detection rate. Given the …xed utility di¤erential, the change in lifetime utility of social assistance recipients is exclusively determined by the impact on employment opportunities. Those living on unemployment bene…ts are a¤ected by the impact on the job acquisition rate in a similar fashion. In addition, they su¤er from the expectation of losing their bene…ts earlier. Hence, it is unsurprising that unemployment bene…t recipients tend to be the losers of the reform in terms of utility di¤erentials.
Comparative static results can be derived in the usual way. Rewriting the equilibrium conditions (34), with equality, and (19) as
according to the implicit function theorem.
Evaluating (37) yields
As the wage share F 0 (L)L F (L) < 1 can be arbitrarily close to unity and the interest rate r may be close to zero, the sign of @L @h is clearly indeterminate.
Further, it turns out that
This term is positive provided that @t @L is not too negative.
Increasing the bene…t loss rate in the modi…ed model raises the incentives to shirk, as the utility di¤erential between the two states of unemployment is shrinking. Thus, the no-shirking curve shifts upwards. This e¤ect tends to decrease employment. Taken in isolation, the net wage will fall if the feasibility curve is upward sloping at the stable equilibrium, and it will rise if the feasibility curve is downward sloping there. At the same time, with a smaller cost per unemployed worker, the feasibility curve shifts upwards. As more people can be pro…tably employed at a given net wage, this e¤ect tends to increase employment and also the net wage. Clearly, employment can move in either direction.
The net wage will always rise if unemployment does not increase.
Concluding discussion
The main message of this paper is that changes in the net wage are of particular importance when evaluating the welfare consequences of introducing or tightening time limits in unemployment bene…t or welfare systems. Lifetime utilities of employed and short-term unemployed workers move in the same direction as the net wage, while the long-term 21 unemployed may gain in expected lifetime utility even if their prospective net wage falls.
Although unemployment is generally reduced, the structure of unemployment may in extreme cases evolve in an unexpected fashion. In itself, the stricter time limit induces a reduction in the share of those recieving full bene…ts. At the same time, the rising number of jobs reduces the average duration of unemployment, such that the resulting higher share of short-term unemployed could o¤set the direct e¤ect of the stricter time limit.
Evaluating the overall welfare consequences of introducing or tightening time limits on bene…t receipt remains di¢cult due to the distributional implications. While the expected increase in total output involves the potential for a Pareto improvement, a higher share of low bene…t recipients is certain when the time limit is introduced, and it will often turn out when the time limit is tightened. On the other hand, our analysis indicates that recipients of low bene…ts are the winners of the reform in terms of changes in utility di¤erentials when compared to other types of workers.
Allowing for a heterogeneous workforce does not change the results substantially. It is still true that changes in net wages drive the e¤ects for utility levels of employed workers and short-term unemployed. The skill premium in terms of utility is an increasing function of the net wage of unskilled workers. This last result will presumably no longer hold if the di¤erent types of labor are complements rather than substitutes. As the ratio of unskilled workers to skilled workers is expected to go up when the time limit is tightened, the skill premium will probably rise.
The consequences of stricter time limits are completely di¤erent if legal rules are actually enforced that deny access for dismissed shirkers to the more generous tier of the unemployment compensation scheme. In this case, stricter time limits increase the incentive to shirk because the reform hurts non-shirkers more than shirkers. The reason is that the unemployed who are not dismissed because of shirking receive unemployment bene…ts for a shorter period of time. Employment gains may still arise due to the falling cost of an 22 unemployed at a given level of total employment. It turns out that the change in employment is crucial for assessing the gains of employed workers and long-term unemployed.
The short-term unemployed tend to be the losers of stricter time limits.
Obviously, a possible extension of our analysis would be to investigate the structure of an optimal unemployment scheme in a framework with risk averse agents, where both the bene…t levels and the bene…t loss rate can be chosen. However, as Fath and Fuest (2005) have shown, repercussions on the incentive structure of the employed that arise in shirking models will generally imply that there is no demand at all for unemployment insurance.
Hence, even with strong risk aversion the optimum level of bene…ts will typically be equal
Taking into account the su¢cient stability condition ¢ > 0; and ignoring the case that only the necessary condition is satis…ed, it follows that sgn · @ x @h¸= ¡sgn [¢ xh ] : Evaluating the derivatives reveals that
Since @ [V " ¡ V u ] @h = 0, it follows from (3) that r @V " @h = @ (1 ¡ t)w @h .
B: Impact on the tax rate
Calculating the impact of a higher bene…t loss rate on the tax rate from equation (19), and taking into account (14), yields 
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The …rst term on the right-hand side re ‡ects the smaller expenditure level due to the higher share of social assistance recipients at a given unemployment rate. The second term mirrors the shift in the structure of unemployment towards a higher share of those receiving unemployment bene…ts with a fall in total unemployment. Finally, the third term indicates the increase of the tax base. Taking into account It follows that @t @h < 0 if either the discount rate r or the bene…t loss rate h is su¢ciently close to zero:
C: Example with falling share of social assistance recipients Assume a production function with diminishing marginal returns pL ® + 3L with the parameter values p = 10000 and ® = :001, a population of N = 1; 000, an interest rate of r = :04, a required e¤ort of e = :1, a separation rate of b = :01, a detection probability of q = :9, unemployment bene…ts of w = 1 and social assistance bene…ts of w = :1. In It turns out that the share of regular social assistance recipients falls when the bene…t loss rate is increased from .2 to .4. The opposite reaction occurs when the rate is further increased from .4 to .8.
D: Proof of Proposition 2
Note that the no-shirking constraint for skilled workers is
where V S u denotes lifetime utility of a skilled social assistance recipient. Taking the noshirking constraints to hold with equality and subtracting (3) from (45) yields (1 ¡ t)w(® ¡ 1) = r(V S u ¡ V u ):
It immediately follows that
Since V S " ¡ V S u = V " ¡ V u = e=q, equation (2) and the corresponding version for skilled workers imply sgn · dV " dh¸= sgn · dV S " dh¸= sg n · d(1 ¡ t)w dh¸:
27

E: Proof of Proposition 3
It is immediate from equation (31) that @[V " ¡ V z ] @h = 0: Inspection of (5) and (14) reveals that sgn · @ V z @h¸= sgn · @a @ h¸= sgn · @L @h¸.
Finally, (9) shows that @a @ h > ¡1 is necessary and su¢cient for @[V u ¡ V z ] @h < 0: 
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